diff --git a/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml b/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
index f9e846e68..36e82a67b 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
@@ -3,8 +3,13 @@ name: Docker Build and Publish
 on:
   push:
     branches: [main]
-  pull_request:
-    branches: [main]
+    paths:
+      - '**/*.py'
+      - 'pyproject.toml'
+      - 'uv.lock'
+      - 'Dockerfile'
+      - 'docker/**'
+      - '.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml'
   release:
     types: [published]
 
diff --git a/.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml b/.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 4aa0fd321..000000000
--- a/.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-name: Supply Chain Audit
-
-on:
-  pull_request:
-    types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
-
-permissions:
-  pull-requests: write
-  contents: read
-
-jobs:
-  scan:
-    name: Scan PR for supply chain risks
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5  # v4
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 0
-
-      - name: Scan diff for suspicious patterns
-        id: scan
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-
-          BASE="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
-          HEAD="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
-
-          # Get the full diff (added lines only)
-          DIFF=$(git diff "$BASE".."$HEAD" -- . ':!uv.lock' ':!*.lock' ':!package-lock.json' ':!yarn.lock' || true)
-
-          FINDINGS=""
-          CRITICAL=false
-
-          # --- .pth files (auto-execute on Python startup) ---
-          PTH_FILES=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep '\.pth$' || true)
-          if [ -n "$PTH_FILES" ]; then
-            CRITICAL=true
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### 🚨 CRITICAL: .pth file added or modified
-          Python \`.pth\` files in \`site-packages/\` execute automatically when the interpreter starts — no import required. This is the exact mechanism used in the [litellm supply chain attack](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/24512).
-
-          **Files:**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${PTH_FILES}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- base64 + exec/eval combo (the litellm attack pattern) ---
-          B64_EXEC_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -iE 'base64\.(b64decode|decodebytes|urlsafe_b64decode)' | grep -iE 'exec\(|eval\(' | head -10 || true)
-          if [ -n "$B64_EXEC_HITS" ]; then
-            CRITICAL=true
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### 🚨 CRITICAL: base64 decode + exec/eval combo
-          This is the exact pattern used in the [litellm supply chain attack](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/24512) — base64-decoded strings passed to exec/eval to hide credential-stealing payloads.
-
-          **Matches:**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${B64_EXEC_HITS}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- base64 decode/encode (alone — legitimate uses exist) ---
-          B64_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -iE 'base64\.(b64decode|b64encode|decodebytes|encodebytes|urlsafe_b64decode)|atob\(|btoa\(|Buffer\.from\(.*base64' | head -20 || true)
-          if [ -n "$B64_HITS" ]; then
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### ⚠️ WARNING: base64 encoding/decoding detected
-          Base64 has legitimate uses (images, JWT, etc.) but is also commonly used to obfuscate malicious payloads. Verify the usage is appropriate.
-
-          **Matches (first 20):**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${B64_HITS}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- exec/eval with string arguments ---
-          EXEC_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -E '(exec|eval)\s*\(' | grep -v '^\+\s*#' | grep -v 'test_\|mock\|assert\|# ' | head -20 || true)
-          if [ -n "$EXEC_HITS" ]; then
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### ⚠️ WARNING: exec() or eval() usage
-          Dynamic code execution can hide malicious behavior, especially when combined with base64 or network fetches.
-
-          **Matches (first 20):**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${EXEC_HITS}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- subprocess with encoded/obfuscated commands ---
-          PROC_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -E 'subprocess\.(Popen|call|run)\s*\(' | grep -iE 'base64|decode|encode|\\x|chr\(' | head -10 || true)
-          if [ -n "$PROC_HITS" ]; then
-            CRITICAL=true
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### 🚨 CRITICAL: subprocess with encoded/obfuscated command
-          Subprocess calls with encoded arguments are a strong indicator of payload execution.
-
-          **Matches:**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${PROC_HITS}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- Network calls to non-standard domains ---
-          EXFIL_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -iE 'requests\.(post|put)\(|httpx\.(post|put)\(|urllib\.request\.urlopen' | grep -v '^\+\s*#' | grep -v 'test_\|mock\|assert' | head -10 || true)
-          if [ -n "$EXFIL_HITS" ]; then
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### ⚠️ WARNING: Outbound network calls (POST/PUT)
-          Outbound POST/PUT requests in new code could be data exfiltration. Verify the destination URLs are legitimate.
-
-          **Matches (first 10):**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${EXFIL_HITS}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- setup.py / setup.cfg install hooks ---
-          SETUP_HITS=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep -E '(setup\.py|setup\.cfg|__init__\.pth|sitecustomize\.py|usercustomize\.py)$' || true)
-          if [ -n "$SETUP_HITS" ]; then
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### ⚠️ WARNING: Install hook files modified
-          These files can execute code during package installation or interpreter startup.
-
-          **Files:**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${SETUP_HITS}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- Compile/marshal/pickle (code object injection) ---
-          MARSHAL_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep -iE 'marshal\.loads|pickle\.loads|compile\(' | grep -v '^\+\s*#' | grep -v 'test_\|re\.compile\|ast\.compile' | head -10 || true)
-          if [ -n "$MARSHAL_HITS" ]; then
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### ⚠️ WARNING: marshal/pickle/compile usage
-          These can deserialize or construct executable code objects.
-
-          **Matches:**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${MARSHAL_HITS}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- CI/CD workflow files modified ---
-          WORKFLOW_HITS=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep -E '\.github/workflows/.*\.ya?ml$' || true)
-          if [ -n "$WORKFLOW_HITS" ]; then
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### ⚠️ WARNING: CI/CD workflow files modified
-          Changes to workflow files can alter build pipelines, inject steps, or modify permissions. Verify no unauthorized actions or secrets access were added.
-
-          **Files:**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${WORKFLOW_HITS}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- Dockerfile / container build files modified ---
-          DOCKER_HITS=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep -iE '(Dockerfile|\.dockerignore|docker-compose)' || true)
-          if [ -n "$DOCKER_HITS" ]; then
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### ⚠️ WARNING: Container build files modified
-          Changes to Dockerfiles or compose files can alter base images, add build steps, or expose ports. Verify base image pins and build commands.
-
-          **Files:**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${DOCKER_HITS}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- Dependency manifest files modified ---
-          DEP_HITS=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE".."$HEAD" | grep -E '(pyproject\.toml|requirements.*\.txt|package\.json|Gemfile|go\.mod|Cargo\.toml)$' || true)
-          if [ -n "$DEP_HITS" ]; then
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### ⚠️ WARNING: Dependency manifest files modified
-          Changes to dependency files can introduce new packages or change version pins. Verify all dependency changes are intentional and from trusted sources.
-
-          **Files:**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${DEP_HITS}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- GitHub Actions version unpinning (mutable tags instead of SHAs) ---
-          ACTIONS_UNPIN=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^\+' | grep 'uses:' | grep -v '#' | grep -E '@v[0-9]' | head -10 || true)
-          if [ -n "$ACTIONS_UNPIN" ]; then
-            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
-          ### ⚠️ WARNING: GitHub Actions with mutable version tags
-          Actions should be pinned to full commit SHAs (not \`@v4\`, \`@v5\`). Mutable tags can be retargeted silently if a maintainer account is compromised.
-
-          **Matches:**
-          \`\`\`
-          ${ACTIONS_UNPIN}
-          \`\`\`
-          "
-          fi
-
-          # --- Output results ---
-          if [ -n "$FINDINGS" ]; then
-            echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-            if [ "$CRITICAL" = true ]; then
-              echo "critical=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-            else
-              echo "critical=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-            fi
-            # Write findings to a file (multiline env vars are fragile)
-            echo "$FINDINGS" > /tmp/findings.md
-          else
-            echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-            echo "critical=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      - name: Post warning comment
-        if: steps.scan.outputs.found == 'true'
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          SEVERITY="⚠️ Supply Chain Risk Detected"
-          if [ "${{ steps.scan.outputs.critical }}" = "true" ]; then
-            SEVERITY="🚨 CRITICAL Supply Chain Risk Detected"
-          fi
-
-          BODY="## ${SEVERITY}
-
-          This PR contains patterns commonly associated with supply chain attacks. This does **not** mean the PR is malicious — but these patterns require careful human review before merging.
-
-          $(cat /tmp/findings.md)
-
-          ---
-          *Automated scan triggered by [supply-chain-audit](/.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml). If this is a false positive, a maintainer can approve after manual review.*"
-
-          gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body "$BODY" || echo "::warning::Could not post PR comment (expected for fork PRs — GITHUB_TOKEN is read-only)"
-
-      - name: Fail on critical findings
-        if: steps.scan.outputs.critical == 'true'
-        run: |
-          echo "::error::CRITICAL supply chain risk patterns detected in this PR. See the PR comment for details."
-          exit 1
diff --git a/.github/workflows/tests.yml b/.github/workflows/tests.yml
index 7d0822690..02248d250 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/tests.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/tests.yml
@@ -3,8 +3,14 @@ name: Tests
 on:
   push:
     branches: [main]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '**/*.md'
+      - 'docs/**'
   pull_request:
     branches: [main]
+    paths-ignore:
+      - '**/*.md'
+      - 'docs/**'
 
 permissions:
   contents: read