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fix(vision): bound the sandbox exec-read at the ingest cap
The container exec-read piped the whole file through base64 with no size guard — the 50MB cap was only enforced host-side AFTER the full payload had already streamed into host memory. A prompt-injected read of a huge container file (or /dev/zero) could balloon the gateway process. head -c (cap+1) bounds the read inside the sandbox; the +1 byte lets the host distinguish at-cap from over-cap and reject with SourceTooLarge. Input redirect replaces 'base64 --' (no argv exposure at all for leading-dash paths). Docker integration tests re-verified live.
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2 changed files with 35 additions and 5 deletions
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@ -277,16 +277,26 @@ async def _resolve_container_fallback(p: Path, ctx: ResolveContext, src: str) ->
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f"session is available to read it",
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src=src, origin="container")
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# Bound the read INSIDE the sandbox: head -c caps at ingest-limit+1 bytes
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# so a huge file (or /dev/zero) can't stream unbounded base64 into host
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# memory — the +1 byte lets us distinguish "exactly at the cap" from
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# "over the cap" after decode. The input redirect (< path) avoids argv
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# entirely, so leading-dash paths can't be parsed as options; base64
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# -w0 is GNU-only, so pipe through tr -d for BusyBox.
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# env.execute is a blocking backend exec; keep it off the event loop so a
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# multi-MB base64 read doesn't stall every other coroutine.
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qp = shlex.quote(str(p))
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res = await asyncio.to_thread(
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env.execute, f"base64 -- {shlex.quote(str(p))} | tr -d '\\n'")
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env.execute,
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f"head -c {_MAX_INGEST_BYTES + 1} < {qp} | base64 | tr -d '\\n'")
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if res.get("returncode", 1) != 0:
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raise SourceNotFound(f"could not read '{p}' inside the sandbox", src=src, origin="container")
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try:
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data = base64.b64decode(res.get("output", ""), validate=True)
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except Exception as exc:
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raise NotAnImage(f"sandbox returned non-image data for '{p}': {exc}", src=src)
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if len(data) > _MAX_INGEST_BYTES:
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raise SourceTooLarge("image exceeds size limit", src=src, origin="container")
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return _finalize(data, "", "container", src)
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