fix(security): add SSRF protection to vision_tools and web_tools (hardened)

* fix(security): add SSRF protection to vision_tools and web_tools

Both vision_analyze and web_extract/web_crawl accept arbitrary URLs
without checking if they target private/internal network addresses.
A prompt-injected or malicious skill could use this to access cloud
metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), localhost services, or private
network hosts.

Adds a shared url_safety.is_safe_url() that resolves hostnames and
blocks private, loopback, link-local, and reserved IP ranges. Also
blocks known internal hostnames (metadata.google.internal).

Integrated at the URL validation layer in vision_tools and before
each website_policy check in web_tools (extract, crawl).

* test(vision): update localhost test to reflect SSRF protection

The existing test_valid_url_with_port asserted localhost URLs pass
validation. With SSRF protection, localhost is now correctly blocked.
Update the test to verify the block, and add a separate test for
valid URLs with ports using a public hostname.

* fix(security): harden SSRF protection — fail-closed, CGNAT, multicast, redirect guard

Follow-up hardening on top of dieutx's SSRF protection (PR #2630):

- Change fail-open to fail-closed: DNS errors and unexpected exceptions
  now block the request instead of allowing it (OWASP best practice)
- Block CGNAT range (100.64.0.0/10): Python's ipaddress.is_private
  does NOT cover this range (returns False for both is_private and
  is_global). Used by Tailscale/WireGuard and carrier infrastructure.
- Add is_multicast and is_unspecified checks: multicast (224.0.0.0/4)
  and unspecified (0.0.0.0) addresses were not caught by the original
  four-check chain
- Add redirect guard for vision_tools: httpx event hook re-validates
  each redirect target against SSRF checks, preventing the classic
  redirect-based SSRF bypass (302 to internal IP)
- Move SSRF filtering before backend dispatch in web_extract: now
  covers Parallel and Tavily backends, not just Firecrawl
- Extract _is_blocked_ip() helper for cleaner IP range checking
- Add 24 new tests (CGNAT, multicast, IPv4-mapped IPv6, fail-closed
  behavior, parametrized blocked/allowed IP lists)
- Fix existing tests to mock DNS resolution for test hostnames

---------

Co-authored-by: dieutx <dangtc94@gmail.com>
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Teknium 2026-03-23 15:40:42 -07:00 committed by GitHub
parent 934fbe3c06
commit 0791efe2c3
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6 changed files with 472 additions and 124 deletions

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@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ import httpx
from firecrawl import Firecrawl
from agent.auxiliary_client import async_call_llm
from tools.debug_helpers import DebugSession
from tools.url_safety import is_safe_url
from tools.website_policy import check_website_access
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@ -861,136 +862,155 @@ async def web_extract_tool(
try:
logger.info("Extracting content from %d URL(s)", len(urls))
# Dispatch to the configured backend
backend = _get_backend()
if backend == "parallel":
results = await _parallel_extract(urls)
elif backend == "tavily":
logger.info("Tavily extract: %d URL(s)", len(urls))
raw = _tavily_request("extract", {
"urls": urls,
"include_images": False,
})
results = _normalize_tavily_documents(raw, fallback_url=urls[0] if urls else "")
else:
# ── Firecrawl extraction ──
# Determine requested formats for Firecrawl v2
formats: List[str] = []
if format == "markdown":
formats = ["markdown"]
elif format == "html":
formats = ["html"]
# ── SSRF protection — filter out private/internal URLs before any backend ──
safe_urls = []
ssrf_blocked: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for url in urls:
if not is_safe_url(url):
ssrf_blocked.append({
"url": url, "title": "", "content": "",
"error": "Blocked: URL targets a private or internal network address",
})
else:
# Default: request markdown for LLM-readiness and include html as backup
formats = ["markdown", "html"]
safe_urls.append(url)
# Always use individual scraping for simplicity and reliability
# Batch scraping adds complexity without much benefit for small numbers of URLs
results: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
# Dispatch only safe URLs to the configured backend
if not safe_urls:
results = []
else:
backend = _get_backend()
from tools.interrupt import is_interrupted as _is_interrupted
for url in urls:
if _is_interrupted():
results.append({"url": url, "error": "Interrupted", "title": ""})
continue
if backend == "parallel":
results = await _parallel_extract(safe_urls)
elif backend == "tavily":
logger.info("Tavily extract: %d URL(s)", len(safe_urls))
raw = _tavily_request("extract", {
"urls": safe_urls,
"include_images": False,
})
results = _normalize_tavily_documents(raw, fallback_url=safe_urls[0] if safe_urls else "")
else:
# ── Firecrawl extraction ──
# Determine requested formats for Firecrawl v2
formats: List[str] = []
if format == "markdown":
formats = ["markdown"]
elif format == "html":
formats = ["html"]
else:
# Default: request markdown for LLM-readiness and include html as backup
formats = ["markdown", "html"]
# Website policy check — block before fetching
blocked = check_website_access(url)
if blocked:
logger.info("Blocked web_extract for %s by rule %s", blocked["host"], blocked["rule"])
results.append({
"url": url, "title": "", "content": "",
"error": blocked["message"],
"blocked_by_policy": {"host": blocked["host"], "rule": blocked["rule"], "source": blocked["source"]},
})
continue
# Always use individual scraping for simplicity and reliability
# Batch scraping adds complexity without much benefit for small numbers of URLs
results: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
try:
logger.info("Scraping: %s", url)
scrape_result = _get_firecrawl_client().scrape(
url=url,
formats=formats
)
from tools.interrupt import is_interrupted as _is_interrupted
for url in safe_urls:
if _is_interrupted():
results.append({"url": url, "error": "Interrupted", "title": ""})
continue
# Process the result - properly handle object serialization
metadata = {}
title = ""
content_markdown = None
content_html = None
# Extract data from the scrape result
if hasattr(scrape_result, 'model_dump'):
# Pydantic model - use model_dump to get dict
result_dict = scrape_result.model_dump()
content_markdown = result_dict.get('markdown')
content_html = result_dict.get('html')
metadata = result_dict.get('metadata', {})
elif hasattr(scrape_result, '__dict__'):
# Regular object with attributes
content_markdown = getattr(scrape_result, 'markdown', None)
content_html = getattr(scrape_result, 'html', None)
# Handle metadata - convert to dict if it's an object
metadata_obj = getattr(scrape_result, 'metadata', {})
if hasattr(metadata_obj, 'model_dump'):
metadata = metadata_obj.model_dump()
elif hasattr(metadata_obj, '__dict__'):
metadata = metadata_obj.__dict__
elif isinstance(metadata_obj, dict):
metadata = metadata_obj
else:
metadata = {}
elif isinstance(scrape_result, dict):
# Already a dictionary
content_markdown = scrape_result.get('markdown')
content_html = scrape_result.get('html')
metadata = scrape_result.get('metadata', {})
# Ensure metadata is a dict (not an object)
if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
if hasattr(metadata, 'model_dump'):
metadata = metadata.model_dump()
elif hasattr(metadata, '__dict__'):
metadata = metadata.__dict__
else:
metadata = {}
# Get title from metadata
title = metadata.get("title", "")
# Re-check final URL after redirect
final_url = metadata.get("sourceURL", url)
final_blocked = check_website_access(final_url)
if final_blocked:
logger.info("Blocked redirected web_extract for %s by rule %s", final_blocked["host"], final_blocked["rule"])
# Website policy check — block before fetching
blocked = check_website_access(url)
if blocked:
logger.info("Blocked web_extract for %s by rule %s", blocked["host"], blocked["rule"])
results.append({
"url": final_url, "title": title, "content": "", "raw_content": "",
"error": final_blocked["message"],
"blocked_by_policy": {"host": final_blocked["host"], "rule": final_blocked["rule"], "source": final_blocked["source"]},
"url": url, "title": "", "content": "",
"error": blocked["message"],
"blocked_by_policy": {"host": blocked["host"], "rule": blocked["rule"], "source": blocked["source"]},
})
continue
# Choose content based on requested format
chosen_content = content_markdown if (format == "markdown" or (format is None and content_markdown)) else content_html or content_markdown or ""
try:
logger.info("Scraping: %s", url)
scrape_result = _get_firecrawl_client().scrape(
url=url,
formats=formats
)
results.append({
"url": final_url,
"title": title,
"content": chosen_content,
"raw_content": chosen_content,
"metadata": metadata # Now guaranteed to be a dict
})
# Process the result - properly handle object serialization
metadata = {}
title = ""
content_markdown = None
content_html = None
except Exception as scrape_err:
logger.debug("Scrape failed for %s: %s", url, scrape_err)
results.append({
"url": url,
"title": "",
"content": "",
"raw_content": "",
"error": str(scrape_err)
})
# Extract data from the scrape result
if hasattr(scrape_result, 'model_dump'):
# Pydantic model - use model_dump to get dict
result_dict = scrape_result.model_dump()
content_markdown = result_dict.get('markdown')
content_html = result_dict.get('html')
metadata = result_dict.get('metadata', {})
elif hasattr(scrape_result, '__dict__'):
# Regular object with attributes
content_markdown = getattr(scrape_result, 'markdown', None)
content_html = getattr(scrape_result, 'html', None)
# Handle metadata - convert to dict if it's an object
metadata_obj = getattr(scrape_result, 'metadata', {})
if hasattr(metadata_obj, 'model_dump'):
metadata = metadata_obj.model_dump()
elif hasattr(metadata_obj, '__dict__'):
metadata = metadata_obj.__dict__
elif isinstance(metadata_obj, dict):
metadata = metadata_obj
else:
metadata = {}
elif isinstance(scrape_result, dict):
# Already a dictionary
content_markdown = scrape_result.get('markdown')
content_html = scrape_result.get('html')
metadata = scrape_result.get('metadata', {})
# Ensure metadata is a dict (not an object)
if not isinstance(metadata, dict):
if hasattr(metadata, 'model_dump'):
metadata = metadata.model_dump()
elif hasattr(metadata, '__dict__'):
metadata = metadata.__dict__
else:
metadata = {}
# Get title from metadata
title = metadata.get("title", "")
# Re-check final URL after redirect
final_url = metadata.get("sourceURL", url)
final_blocked = check_website_access(final_url)
if final_blocked:
logger.info("Blocked redirected web_extract for %s by rule %s", final_blocked["host"], final_blocked["rule"])
results.append({
"url": final_url, "title": title, "content": "", "raw_content": "",
"error": final_blocked["message"],
"blocked_by_policy": {"host": final_blocked["host"], "rule": final_blocked["rule"], "source": final_blocked["source"]},
})
continue
# Choose content based on requested format
chosen_content = content_markdown if (format == "markdown" or (format is None and content_markdown)) else content_html or content_markdown or ""
results.append({
"url": final_url,
"title": title,
"content": chosen_content,
"raw_content": chosen_content,
"metadata": metadata # Now guaranteed to be a dict
})
except Exception as scrape_err:
logger.debug("Scrape failed for %s: %s", url, scrape_err)
results.append({
"url": url,
"title": "",
"content": "",
"raw_content": "",
"error": str(scrape_err)
})
# Merge any SSRF-blocked results back in
if ssrf_blocked:
results = ssrf_blocked + results
response = {"results": results}
@ -1173,6 +1193,11 @@ async def web_crawl_tool(
if not url.startswith(('http://', 'https://')):
url = f'https://{url}'
# SSRF protection — block private/internal addresses
if not is_safe_url(url):
return json.dumps({"results": [{"url": url, "title": "", "content": "",
"error": "Blocked: URL targets a private or internal network address"}]}, ensure_ascii=False)
# Website policy check
blocked = check_website_access(url)
if blocked:
@ -1258,6 +1283,11 @@ async def web_crawl_tool(
instructions_text = f" with instructions: '{instructions}'" if instructions else ""
logger.info("Crawling %s%s", url, instructions_text)
# SSRF protection — block private/internal addresses
if not is_safe_url(url):
return json.dumps({"results": [{"url": url, "title": "", "content": "",
"error": "Blocked: URL targets a private or internal network address"}]}, ensure_ascii=False)
# Website policy check — block before crawling
blocked = check_website_access(url)
if blocked: