security(deps): add upper bounds to 5 loose deps + document supply chain policy (#24226)

After the Mini Shai-Hulud supply chain campaign (May 2026) and the litellm
compromise (March 2026), codify the dependency pinning policy that was
established in PRs #2810 and #9801 but never written down for contributors.

Changes:
- pyproject.toml: Add tight upper bounds to the 5 deps that slipped
  through as review escapes from external contributor PRs:
  - hindsight-client>=0.4.22,<0.5 (was >=0.4.22)
  - aiosqlite>=0.20,<0.23 (was >=0.20)
  - asyncpg>=0.29,<0.32 (was >=0.29)
  - alibabacloud-dingtalk>=2.0.0,<3 (was >=2.0.0)
  - youtube-transcript-api>=1.2.0,<2 (was >=1.2.0)

  Pre-1.0 packages get <0.(current_minor+2) — tight enough to block
  hostile minor releases but loose enough to not require bumps every week.

- CONTRIBUTING.md: Add 'Dependency pinning policy' section under Security
  with the full rationale, table of source types + treatments, and examples.

- AGENTS.md: Add concise 'Dependency Pinning Policy' section for AI coding
  agents with the decision table and step-by-step checklist.

- supply-chain-audit.yml: Add dep-bounds job that fails PRs introducing
  PyPI deps without <ceiling upper bounds. Fires on pyproject.toml changes.
  Posts a PR comment with the specific unbounded specs found.

Refs: #2796 #2810 #9801 #24205
This commit is contained in:
Siddharth Balyan 2026-05-15 14:03:08 +05:30 committed by GitHub
parent 681778a0b7
commit 04b1fdaecf
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
3 changed files with 130 additions and 0 deletions

View file

@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ on:
- '**/sitecustomize.py'
- '**/usercustomize.py'
- '**/__init__.pth'
- 'pyproject.toml'
permissions:
pull-requests: write
@ -137,3 +138,68 @@ jobs:
run: |
echo "::error::CRITICAL supply chain risk patterns detected in this PR. See the PR comment for details."
exit 1
dep-bounds:
name: Check PyPI dependency upper bounds
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
if: contains(github.event.pull_request.changed_files_url, 'pyproject.toml') || true
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Check for unbounded PyPI deps
id: bounds
run: |
set -euo pipefail
BASE="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
HEAD="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"
# Only check added lines in pyproject.toml
ADDED=$(git diff "$BASE".."$HEAD" -- pyproject.toml | grep '^+' | grep -v '^+++' || true)
if [ -z "$ADDED" ]; then
echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
exit 0
fi
# Match PyPI dep specs that have >= but no < ceiling.
# Pattern: "package>=version" without a following ",<" bound.
# Excludes git+ URLs (which use commit SHAs) and comments.
UNBOUNDED=$(echo "$ADDED" | grep -oE '"[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+(\[[^\]]*\])?>=[ 0-9.]+"' | grep -v ',<' || true)
if [ -n "$UNBOUNDED" ]; then
echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "$UNBOUNDED" > /tmp/unbounded.txt
else
echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
fi
- name: Post unbounded dep warning
if: steps.bounds.outputs.found == 'true'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
BODY="## ⚠️ Unbounded PyPI Dependency Detected
This PR adds PyPI dependencies without a \`<next_major\` upper bound. Per our [supply chain policy](../blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#dependency-pinning-policy-supply-chain-hardening), all PyPI deps must be pinned as \`>=floor,<next_major\`.
**Unbounded specs found:**
\`\`\`
$(cat /tmp/unbounded.txt)
\`\`\`
**Fix:** Add an upper bound, e.g. \`\"package>=1.2.0,<2\"\`
---
*See PR #2810 and CONTRIBUTING.md for the full policy rationale.*"
gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body "$BODY" || echo "::warning::Could not post PR comment (expected for fork PRs)"
- name: Fail on unbounded deps
if: steps.bounds.outputs.found == 'true'
run: |
echo "::error::PyPI dependencies without upper bounds detected. Add <next_major ceiling per CONTRIBUTING.md policy."
exit 1