docs: comprehensive docs audit — fix 12 stale/missing items across 10 pages (#3618)

Fixes found by auditing docs against recent PRs/commits:

Critical (misleading):
- hooks.md: Remove stale 'planned — not yet wired' markers for 4 hooks
  that are now active (#3542). Add correct callback signatures.
- security.md: Update tirith verdict behavior — block verdicts now go
  through approval flow instead of hard-blocking (#3428). Add pkill/killall
  self-termination guard and gateway-run backgrounding patterns (#3593).

New feature docs:
- configuration.md: Add tool_use_enforcement section with value table
  (auto/true/false/list) from #3551/#3528.
- configuration.md: Expand auxiliary config with per-task timeouts
  (compression 120s, web_extract 30s, approval 30s) from #3597.
- api-server.md: Add /v1/health alias, Security Headers section,
  CORS details (Max-Age, SSE headers, Idempotency-Key) from
  #3572/#3573/#3576/#3580/#3530.

Stale/incomplete:
- configuration.md: Fix Alibaba model name qwen-plus -> qwen3.5-plus (#3484).
- environment-variables.md: Specify actual DashScope default URL.
- cli-commands.md: Add alibaba to --provider list.
- fallback-providers.md: Add Alibaba/DashScope to provider table.
- email.md: Document noreply/automated sender filtering (#3606).
- toolsets-reference.md: Add 4 missing platform toolsets — matrix,
  mattermost, dingtalk, api-server (#3583).
- skills.md: List default GitHub taps including garrytan/gstack (#3605).

website/docs/user-guide/security.md

@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ The following patterns trigger approval prompts (defined in `tools/approval.py`)
 | `bash -c`, `python -e` | Shell/script execution via flags |
 | `find -exec rm`, `find -delete` | Find with destructive actions |
 | Fork bomb patterns | Fork bombs |
+| `pkill`/`killall` hermes/gateway | Self-termination prevention |
+| `gateway run` with `&`/`disown`/`nohup` | Prevents starting gateway outside service manager |
 
 :::info
 **Container bypass**: When running in `docker`, `singularity`, `modal`, or `daytona` backends, dangerous command checks are **skipped** because the container itself is the security boundary. Destructive commands inside a container can't harm the host.
@@ -392,7 +394,7 @@ security:
 
 When `tirith_fail_open` is `true` (default), commands proceed if tirith is not installed or times out. Set to `false` in high-security environments to block commands when tirith is unavailable.
 
-Tirith's verdict integrates with the approval flow: safe commands pass through, suspicious commands trigger user approval, and dangerous commands are blocked.
+Tirith's verdict integrates with the approval flow: safe commands pass through, while both suspicious and blocked commands trigger user approval with the full tirith findings (severity, title, description, safer alternatives). Users can approve or deny — the default choice is deny to keep unattended scenarios secure.
 
 ### Context File Injection Protection